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Abstract
This paper examines Canadian and other foreign ﬁrms that have been involuntarily delisted from
major U.S. exchanges. I ﬁnd that, for most countries, less than 10% of ﬁrms get delisted from a
U.S. exchange during my sample period. For Canada, more than 25% of firms listed in the
United States get involuntarily delisted. This effect is more pronounced in Nasdaq-listed ﬁrms,
where more than 40% of Canadian ﬁrms eventually get delisted, compared to about 15% of other
foreign ﬁrms. After controlling for ﬁrm characteristics that have an impact on involuntary
delistings, such as size, exchange listing, previous year’s return, volatility, and leverage, Canadian
ﬁrms still have a higher propensity to get delisted than other foreign cross-listed ﬁrms. However,
in a comparison to a U.S. matched sample, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in the
likelihood of Canadian ﬁrms being delisted, relative to these U.S. ﬁrms. These results suggest that
Canadian ﬁrms may have been treated more similarly to U.S. ﬁrms under the U.S. exchanges’
rules and enforcement of their continued listing criteria, and that the bonding provided by U.S.
exchanges may be stronger for Canadian and U.S. ﬁrms. Also, Canadian ﬁrms may have fewer
impediments to listing in the United States such that small, high-growth Canadian ﬁrms have been
more able to access U.S. markets compared to foreign ﬁrms.
JEL classiﬁcation: G30, G38
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
L’auteur étudie les sociétés canadiennes et étrangères dont les titres ont été radiés de grandes
bourses américaines sans leur accord. Il constate que, dans le cas de la plupart des pays, moins de
10 % des entreprises étrangères cotées aux États-Unis ont vu leurs titres radiés pendant la période
considérée. Or, cette proportion dépasse 25 % chez les ﬁrmes canadiennes inscrites à une bourse
américaine. La différence est plus nette pour les sociétés du Nasdaq : le taux de radiation excède
40 % parmi les entreprises canadiennes contre environ 15 % du côté des autres ﬁrmes étrangères.
Même si l’on tient compte des diverses caractéristiques d’une entreprise qui peuvent pousser les
bourses à retirer un titre (comme la taille de la société, la bourse à laquelle elle est inscrite, le
niveau d’endettement, le rendement de l’action durant l’année précédente et sa volatilité), les
entreprises canadiennes demeurent plus susceptibles de subir une radiation que les autres sociétés
étrangères intercotées. Pour autant, elles ne présentent pas sur ce plan d’écart statistique
signiﬁcatif si on les compare aux sociétés d’un échantillon composé d’entreprises américaines
ayant les mêmes caractéristiques. Ces résultats portent à croire que le traitement réservé par les
places boursières aux ﬁrmes canadiennes se rapproche davantage de celui accordé aux entreprisesiv
américaines, du point de vue tant des règles à respecter pour maintenir la cotation que de leur
application. Ils semblent aussi indiquer que ces deux groupes d’entreprises bénéﬁcient davantage
de la crédibilité par association donnée par le parquet d’une bourse américaine. Par ailleurs, il est
possible que les ﬁrmes canadiennes rencontrent moins d’obstacles que les sociétés étrangères
pour s’inscrire à une bourse aux États-Unis, au point de favoriser, sur le marché américain,
l’entrée de petites entreprises canadiennes en forte croissance.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G30, G38
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales1 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper, I examine U.S.-listed foreign firms that get involuntarily delisted by the U.S. 
exchanges over the period from 1988 to 2006. This includes firms that fail to meet the firms’ 
numerical criteria for continued listing, as well as firms that get delisted for more qualitative 
reasons such as an impending bankruptcy or for the protection of investors.  Across most foreign 
countries, approximately 10% of U.S.-listed firms eventually get involuntarily delisted.  For 
Canada, on the other hand, more than 25% of U.S.-listed firms eventually involuntarily delist.  
This effect is more pronounced among Nasdaq-listed firms, where more than 40% of Canadian 
firms eventually get delisted, compared to about 15% of other foreign cross-listed firms.   
Cross-listing is important from a Canadian perspective  because a large number of Canadian 
firms are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.  Theories suggest that firms cross-list to opt-in to the 
regulation and for other benefits of U.S. capital markets.  These benefits include increased 
liquidity in their shares, increased firm visibility, bonding to U.S regulatory institutions, access 
to a larger pool of capital, and ultimately, higher firm valuations and a lower cost of capital [Hail 
and Leuz (2004)].   
The high propensity to delist for Canadian firms listed in the United States implies that a large 
segment of Canadian firms may not have benefited fully from a U.S. listing and that the benefits 
of listing in the United States may be temporary given that many firms do not maintain a U.S. 
listing.  Moreover, a U.S. delisting entails negative consequences for Canadian firms since they 
experience negative stock returns of about 10% in Canada and a sharp drop in home market 
liquidity following an involuntary delisting.  Therefore, it is important to examine what factors 
contribute to Canadian firms being delisted in the United States.   
Canadian firms may have a higher propensity to get delisted in the United States for two reasons.  
First, due to exchange guidelines, the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), and 
similarities between Canada and the United States, Canadian firms may have a lower cost of 
listing in the United States such that small, high-growth Canadian firms with minimal current 
cash flows have been more able to access U.S. markets compared to foreign firms.
1  Second, 
                                                   
1 Fama and French (2004) find an increase in the mortality of U.S. listed firms over time and suggest that this is due 
to a decline in the cost of equity as a greater number of less profitable U.S. and foreign firms with cash flows farther 2 
differences in exchange listing criteria, discretion in enforcing these criteria [Macey, O’Hara, 
and Pompilio (2004)], and differences in the form of U.S. listing (i.e., via ADRs or ordinary 
shares) could have contributed to more Canadian firms being delisted.  This paper uses a Cox 
(1972)  proportional hazard model to determine whether the characteristics and previous 
performance of firms can fully explain the higher proportion of Canadian firms that have been 
delisted.   
Firms may cross-list in the United States to bond themselves to increased monitoring and stiffer 
penalties from the SEC, auditors, U.S. exchanges, institutional shareholders, debt-rating 
agencies, and better boards of directors [Coffee (1999, 2002), Stulz (1999)].  There are several 
recent studies providing arguments and evidence both for [Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004); 
Doidge (2004); Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2005); King and Segal (2004)] and 
against [Licht (2003); Siegel (2004)] the bonding hypothesis.
2  This paper examines the role 
played by U.S. exchanges in bonding and shows that the different exchange listing criteria for 
foreign firms and the exchanges’ discretion in enforcing their continued listing criteria may have 
resulted in fewer non-Canadian foreign firms getting delisted compared to Canadian firms, 
which suggests that the bonding benefit provided by U.S. exchanges may have been greater for 
Canadian firms than for other foreign firms. 
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate differences in U.S. listing requirements for 
U.S., Canadian, and other foreign firms and test to see whether or not they had an impact on the 
likelihood of Canadian firms delisting from the United States.  While some continued listing 
requirements are different for Canadian firms, these differences may not translate into more 
delistings if they are not enforced or if they are not a binding constraint on maintaining a listing.  
If the propensity to delist for Canadian firms is not different after controlling  for firm 
characteristics, this would suggest it is the ease of listing for Canadian firms that has resulted in 
more firms being delisted.  If there is still a difference after controlling for firm characteristics, it 
would suggest that differences in delisting rules and their enforcement may have caused more 
                                                                                                                                                                    
into the future have been able to access U.S. markets.  Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007) also find a similar increase 
in mortality for foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges.     
2 King and Segal (2004) differentiate between legal bonding (i.e., through the courts) and reputational bonding (i.e., 
through the markets) and find evidence in favour of reputational bonding. 3 
Canadian firms to delist (or that firm characteristics and quality are not fully being accounted for 
in the analysis).   
After controlling for firm characteristics that have an impact on involuntary delistings such as 
size, exchange listing, previous year’s return, volatility, and leverage, Canadian firms have a 
higher propensity to get delisted than other foreign cross-listed firms, suggesting there may be 
some differences in delisting rules and enforcement.  Also, in a comparison to a U.S. matched 
sample, there is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of being delisted, relative 
to these U.S. firms.   These results suggest that Canadian firms may have been treated more 
similarly to U.S. firms under the U.S. exchanges’ rules and enforcement of their continued listing 
criteria, and that the bonding provided by U.S. exchanges may be stronger for Canadian and U.S. 
firms.   
I would also like to note that the magnitude of the difference in the propensity to delist between 
Canadian and foreign firms  is much smaller than when firm characteristics are not used to 
explain delisting, so the ease of entry for Canadian firms does still partially explain why 
Canadian firms are more prone to be delisted.  This may be good news in that it indicates the 
larger number of Canadian delistings is partially the result of small Canadian firms with growth 
opportunities having been able to access U.S. markets.   
Like U.S. firms, Canadian firms list their ordinary shares directly in the United States whereas 
most foreign firms list using American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).  This would make it easier 
for foreign firms to meet the minimum price criteria of the exchanges because a firm can choose 
its price on the U.S. exchange since it can reset its ADR ratio (number of home market shares 
represented by one ADR) to facilitate trading in the ADR and to avoid approaching the minimum 
price criteria of the exchanges.  However, I do not find evidence that ADRs are less likely to be 
delisted when compared with a sample of about 75 non-Canadian foreign firms with ordinary 
share listings in the United States. 
I extend the literature on the impacts of delisting by showing that an involuntary delisting from a 
U.S. exchange  results in negative abnormal returns of about 10% for Canadian firms, which 
compares with previous research that shows U.S. firms experience a negative abnormal return of 
8.5% on the delisting announcement day [Sanger and Peterson (1990)] and that foreign firms’ 
returns are about -4.5% when delisting in the United States [Liu (2004)].  Also, I show that 4 
Canadian firms’ home market liquidity declines substantially after delisting in the United States, 
similar to the experience of U.S. firms delisting from a major exchange and subsequently trading 
either in Pink Sheets or OTC Bulletin Board [Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio (2004), 
Panchapagesan and Werner (2004)].  My results are interesting because the home market 
liquidity could potentially increase after a delisting if trading migrates back to the home 
exchange after delisting; however, I show that this is not the case. 
Finally, this paper also  contributes to the cross-listing literature by examining some of the 
benefits of cross-listing over a longer time horizon, in that I follow the cross-listed stocks until 
they delist or until the end of the sample period.  Financial managers cite increased liquidity as 
one of the primary reasons for cross-listing in the United States [Fanto and Karmel (1997), 
Mittoo (1992)] and several papers have found a positive liquidity effect after cross-listing in the 
United States [Foerster and Karolyi (1998), Smith and Sofianos (1996), Domowitz, Glen and 
Madhavan (1997)].    Here, I examine liquidity over a much longer time period and find that 
those Canadian firms that delist from the Nasdaq, who comprise more than 40% of Canadian 
Nasdaq listed firms, do not have a high level of liquidity while cross-listed. The median Nasdaq-
listed Canadian firm that eventually delists does not trade on 10% of trading days. 
A firm may also cross-list to increase its visibility [Merton (1987), Foerster and Karolyi (1999); 
King and Segal (2006)].  Several studies use analyst following as a proxy for visibility and find 
an increase in analyst following after cross-listing and a positive correlation between the change 
in firm value around cross-listing and the change in analyst following [Baker, Nofsinger and 
Weaver (1998); Lang, Lins and Miller (2002)].  I follow Canadian firms’ analyst coverage from 
two years before cross-listing to seven years after cross-listing.  Canadian firms that stay listed 
and those firms that eventually get acquired enjoy a sustained increase in coverage following 
listing.  Those firms that eventually involuntarily or voluntarily delist begin with a low level of 
coverage, and have a small temporary increase in coverage in the two years after cross-listing 
before it declines again.  Again, on average,  Canadian  firms seem to  have  experienced a 
sustained increase in analyst following, but there is a significant segment of Canadian cross-
listed firms that had only a temporary increase in analyst following. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I briefly review the listing criteria for 
foreign firms listing on the major U.S. exchanges.  Section 3 describes the dataset while Section 5 
4 examines post-delisting stock performance of Canadian firms.  I examine why foreign firms 
get involuntarily delisted in the United States in Section 5, and then conclude in Section 6.  
 
2.  Listing and delisting requirements for foreign firms on major U.S. 
exchanges 
The initial listing criteria for foreign companies  differ from the listing criteria  for U.S. 
companies, depending on which major U.S. exchange the security is listed on.  Moreover, 
Canadian firms are subject to different listing criteria than other foreign firms, and this could 
affect the type of firm that can list in the United States.  On the NYSE, domestic listing 
requirements require a minimum number of shares and shareholders within the United States. 
For North American issuers only (i.e., Canadian, U.S., and Mexican issuers), the NYSE will 
consider all North American stockholders and trading volume requirements when applying its 
standards.  As a result of these NYSE standards, it is much easier for small Canadian and 
Mexican companies to list their shares on the NYSE.  However, the NYSE has Alternate Listing 
Standards for foreign private issuers to “encourage major non-U.S. companies to list their shares 
on the Exchange.”  These Alternate Listing Standards are  much  stricter in terms of their 
requirements, but foreign companies may use their worldwide distribution of shares rather than 
its U.S. distribution to meet these standards.   
Except for the minimum bid price, the Nasdaq allows foreign companies to use the underlying 
home market shares to meet the listing criteria if the ADRs do not qualify on their own merits,
3 
so there does not appear to be much differential between Canadian and other foreign firms when 
initially listing on the Nasdaq.  While Nasdaq’s initial listing standards are similar for Canadian 
and non-Canadian firms, ongoing requirements, such as disclosure standards, are different.  As 
an example, without shareholder approval to do otherwise, any company listing common stock is 
required to  disclose  their  equity compensation plans  to  Nasdaq.  Companies listing only 
American Depositary Receipts do not have to provide this disclosure to Nasdaq. 
 
 
                                                   
3 Nasdaq Marketplace Rule 4450(g) and Marketplace Rule 4320(e)(2)(E). 6 
2.1. Numerical Criteria for Continued Listing 
The major U.S. exchanges may suspend trading in a security or delist a security for failing to 
meet certain numerical criteria, such as minimum firm size, price,  number of  publicly held 
shares, number of shareholders, and trading volume, or for more qualitative reasons relating to 
factors such as corporate governance, impending bankruptcy or protection of the public interest.
4  
These continued listing criteria are usually less stringent than the initial criteria for listing and are 
used to maintain the exchange’s reputation
5 and to eliminate those firms which are unprofitable 
to the exchange or market-makers [Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio (2004)]. 
For each exchange, Table 1 shows a high and a low required threshold for each of the numerical 
listing criteria.
6  If a firm is below the high threshold for one criteria, it may be able to maintain 
its listing if it meets certain thresholds along some of the other criteria.  However, if the firm is 
below any of the low threshold criteria, it would be subject to suspension or delisting.  At a 
minimum, the NYSE requires domestic and non-U.S. issuers to have at least $25 million in 
global market capitalization, at least 600,000 public float shares, 400 shareholders, and a 30-day 
average closing price above $1.  
Also, a firm may be delisted if it fails to meet a combination of other criteria relating to 
shareholder’s equity, global market capitalization, revenue, or net income, depending upon the 
standard under which the company originally listed.  Both the Nasdaq and the NYSE have 
similar criteria in terms of public float number of shares, number of shareholders, and minimum 
bid price. 
There has been a change to the Nasdaq’s minimum bid price criteria over the sample period 
which may have had an impact on the number of Canadian firms delisting compared to the 
number of non-Canadian foreign firms delisting.  This criterion was first introduced in 1997, and 
applied to Canadian and U.S. firms.  In 2005, the Nasdaq’s minimum bid price criterion was 
expanded to be applied to foreign, non-Canadian issuers.   
                                                   
4 NYSE manual and Nasdaq Listing Requirements manual. 
5 In a model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2003),  investors infer the exchange’s reputation by the performance of 
listed firms on that exchange. 
6 This table is only meant as a top-level display of the exchanges continued listing criteria.  For full details on each 
exchange’s listing criteria, refer to the exchange listing manual. 7 
Also, Nasdaq implemented a moratorium on enforcing some of its continued listing criteria 
(including the minimum bid price) in the period shortly after September 11
th, 2001 when a 
number of firms experience large declines in share price. 
However, these differences in criteria may not have had an impact on foreign firms delisting for 
two reasons.  First ADR-listed foreign firms can change their ADR ratio to raise their U.S. ADR 
price above $1.  Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) label this a reverse “solo split” and provide 
some anecdotal evidence of two firms that experienced positive price reactions around the 
announcement.  U.S. and Canadian firms can perform a reverse stock split to comply with the 
minimum bid price criteria,  but this typically involves shareholder approval and results in 
significant negative returns [Chambers and Woolridge (1983) Marchman (2007)].  Second, firms 
often fail to meet more than one of the continued listing criteria when they get delisted [Macey, 
O’Hara, and Pompilio (2004)].  I test later to see whether Canadian firms are more likely to get 
delisted, after controlling for firm characteristics, and find evidence in support of this.  
2.2. Qualitative Criteria for Continued Listing 
The exchanges also can decide to delist firms due to poor corporate governance, impending 
bankruptcy or protection of the public interest.   The corporate governance standards may be 
more lenient for foreign firms, both in terms of the rules regarding foreign firms and their 
enforcement [Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2004)]. For example, Nasdaq Marketplace Rule 
4350(a) (1) exempts foreign private issuers from certain Nasdaq governance requirements, so 
long as the company's practices are not prohibited by home country law and it is disclosed in 
annual reports to the S.E.C.  However, foreign issuers cannot become exempt from certain 
governance requirements, such as audit committee requirements. 
3.  Data 
In this paper, I examine a sample of foreign firms that are cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange 
(NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq) between 1988 and 2006.  To develop this sample, I first identify all 
foreign firms in the CRSP dataset based on their CRSP share code
7 and then match these firms to 
Datastream based on the security’s name, CUSIP, ticker and country.  COMPUSTAT, 
Datastream, company websites, and Internet searches are used to identify a company’s country 
                                                   
7 This includes issues with a share code of 30 or 31 (ADR’s) and issues with a share code of 12 (ordinary shares of 
companies that are incorporated outside the United States). 8 
of incorporation, and  I  exclude companies that are incorporated in tax havens such as the 
Cayman Islands and Bermuda. After performing these screens, I have a universe of 1070 U.S. 
cross-listed, foreign firms for a total of 9,512 firm-years.  I also identify 178 involuntary delists, 
liquidations or bankruptcies in the cross-listed universe during the 1988 to 2006 time period 
using delisting codes from the CRSP database,
8  and verify that these were in fact involuntary 
delistings and liquidations using information from Datastream, company websites, Lexis-Nexis 
and Internet searches.    Accounting information is taken from COMPUSTAT and analyst 
coverage is from I/B/E/S. 
3.1. Description of Sample 
In Table 2, I analyze  the sample of involuntary delistings, liquidations, and U.S. listings of 
foreign stocks over time.  The number of U.S. cross-listed foreign stocks increases over time 
from just over 200 in 1988 to a peak over 700 in 2001, and then decrease to just under 600 by the 
end of 2006.  I document fewer US exchange-listed foreign stocks than reported in Karolyi 
(2004) Table 4, but this is due to the fact that I require a home exchange listing for the foreign 
stock (i.e., a match in Datastream) and remove multiple listings of the same company, whereas 
Karolyi is looking at all foreign listings.  There seems to be a higher frequency of involuntary 
delistings occurring on the Nasdaq between 1999 and 2002, with the largest number of delisting 
occurs in 2002, when 20 foreign firms were delisted from the Nasdaq stock exchange.  This is 
consistent with a regulation change that occurred in early 2002, when Nasdaq removed the 
moratorium it had placed on delisting stocks during the period directly following September 11
th, 
2001 after many stocks experienced a large decline in price.  Since its peak in 2001, the number 
of foreign stocks cross-listed on Nasdaq has declined.  
Involuntary delistings explain only about a quarter of the drop in the number of Nasdaq listings.  
Mergers and acquisitions explain about half of the drop in Nasdaq listings over this period and 
voluntary delistings explain the remaining portion of the decline.  On the other hand, the number 
of NYSE listings has  remained relatively stable over this period, which is consistent with 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) who find that New York has not lost its competitiveness 
relative to the London Stock Exchange since the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
                                                   
8 Specifically, stocks with delisting codes below 500 were not classified as delistings.  Also, stocks with delisting 
codes 501,502, 503, 505, 510, 513, 516 and 517 were not classified as delistings since these stocks moved to another 
U.S. exchange.  9 
3.2. Canadian firms vs. other foreign cross-listed firms 
Table 3 shows the number of involuntary delistings, liquidations and U.S.-listed foreign stocks 
by country.  There seems to be an abnormally high number of involuntary delistings and 
liquidations in Canada relative to the number of U.S. cross-listed Canadian firms, with more than 
one quarter of Canadian firms getting involuntarily delisted or liquidated from a major U.S. 
exchange.  In almost every other country, fewer than 10% of firms get involuntarily removed 
from a U.S. exchange.  Australia and Mexico are two exceptions with a similar experience to 
Canada.   Moreover, on the Nasdaq, more than 40% of Canadian firms have been involuntarily 
delisted during  the sample period compared with an average of almost 15% from all o ther 
foreign countries. 
This result could be misleading if Canadian firms are, on average, listed for a longer period of 
time during the sample period.  In Figure 1, I examine the yearly percentage of foreign firms 
getting involuntarily delisted for Canada and the rest of the world (ROW) by each stock 
exchange in two sample periods: Pre-2001 and Post-2001.  In each sample period, the numerator 
includes the number of firms that were involuntarily delisted during the period, and the 
denominator includes the number of firm-year observations during the period.  Even on a yearly 
basis, a much higher proportion of Canadian firms involuntarily delist when compared with the 
rest of the world.  More recently, the proportion of Canadian firms involuntarily delisting has 
decreased, although this proportion is still almost double that of the rest of the world.   
Since cross-listed Canadian firms are much smaller than their foreign counterparts and smaller 
firms are more likely to be involuntary delisted, these results could be caused by the size 
distribution of firms.  However, Figure 2 shows that small (< $100M in total assets) Canadian 
firms are more than three times more likely to get delisted than small foreign firms.  This result 
is robust to thresholds of $50M and $20M in total assets as well.  Larger Canadian firms appear 
to have a similar propensity to get delisted compared with foreign firms. 
In Table 4, I examine summary statistics for the sample of Canadian firms and other foreign 
firms cross-listed on U.S Exchanges.  Panels A and B display statistics for Canadian and foreign 
firms cross-listed on either the NYSE or AMEX.  Canadian cross-listed firms, in both the full 
sample and in sub-samples based on whether the firm eventually delisted, are smaller, have 
fewer analysts covering them and have a lower stock price than non-Canadian foreign cross-10 
listed firms.   Involuntary delists have large, negative stock returns and return on equity, while 
the remaining firms have positive returns.  Also, involuntary delists are smaller, have a higher 
standard deviation, a lower stock price and fewer analysts following them.  There does not 
appear to be much difference in the median Debt / Equity ratio, probably because the majority of 
firms are delisted for reasons other than bankruptcy. 
Similar relationships are found for Nasdaq firms (See Panels C and D).  Canadian cross-listed 
firms are smaller, attract fewer analysts, and have a lower stock price than non-Canadian foreign 
cross-listed firms.  In addition, Canadian firms are more volatile and have exhibited poorer stock 
and accounting returns than their foreign counterparts.    As with NYSE/AMEX firms, Nasdaq’s 
involuntary delists have large, negative stock returns and return on equity, are smaller, have a 
higher standard deviation, a lower stock price and fewer analysts following them.  Furthermore, 
involuntary delists are illiquid.  While many firms cross-list in the United States to improve their 
liquidity [Fanto and Karmel (1997), Mittoo], Canadian cross-listed firms that get delisted from 
Nasdaq, who make up more than 40% of Canadian Nasdaq-listed firms, experience low levels of 
liquidity (relative to those firms that do not delist) in the United States while cross-listed.  The 
median Nasdaq-listed Canadian firm that eventually becomes involuntarily delisted trades on 
only 90% of the days, suggesting minimal liquidity benefits of cross-listing for many Nasdaq-
listed Canadian firms.   However, this low liquidity for Canadian firms may also be related to the 
fact that small Canadian growth firms, who may not have very liquid shares, have an easier time 
to get cross-listed in the United States in the first place.  In Section 5, I examine the determinants 
of delisting to determine whether  this can explain why so many Canadian firms have been 
delisted relative to firms from other countries. 
Since visibility and shareholder awareness are also cited as benefits of cross-listing [(Merton 
(1987); Foerster and Karolyi  (1999)], I also examine the analyst coverage of Canadian firms 
following their listing as a measure of shareholder awareness.  Figure 3 shows the average 
analyst coverage from two years prior to listing to seven years after listing for Canadian firms 
cross-listing on a U.S. exchange between 1988 and 1999.  A similar analysis is performed by 
Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (1998) and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002), but they only measure 
analyst coverage for a short time period after cross-listing so this study takes a more long-term 
view of the effect of cross-listing on analyst coverage and visibility.  The average number of 11 
analysts following the firm is presented for only those firms where a match has been found in 
I/B/E/S, so results may be biased towards increased coverage if the firms without a match had no 
analyst coverage throughout the sample period. 
Canadian firms that eventually delist do not initially attract analysts after their initial listing but 
lose this coverage over time.  On average, coverage increases from about one analyst in the year 
prior to listing to a peak of just over three analysts in the few years following listing and then 
declines afterwards.  Firms that either get acquired or maintain their listing start off with higher 
analyst coverage before listing and experience an increase in coverage in the year of listing and 
maintain this increased coverage throughout the next seven years. 
Overall, top level statistics show that Canadian firms have a higher propensity to get delisted 
compared to other foreign firms, but these statistics also  show that Canadian  firms  have 
characteristics, such as a smaller firm size, that make them more likely to get delisted.  
Therefore, a more in-depth analysis is needed to determine whether it is Canadian firm 
characteristics, which are related to the ease of Canadian firms to list in the United States, or 
differences in exchange delisting rules and their enforcement that have caused a higher number 
of Canadian firms to get delisted. 
4.  The impact of delisting on Canadian firms 
Previous research has shown that U.S. firms experience a negative abnormal return of 8.5% on 
the delisting announcement day [Sanger and Peterson (1990)] and that foreign firms’ returns are 
also negative at about -4.5% when delisting in the United States [Liu (2004)].    Also, firms 
suffer a drop in trading volume and an increase in spreads and volatility when delisting from 
major U.S. exchanges and subsequently trading in the OTC Bulletin Board or Pink Sheets 
[Macey, O’Hara and Pompilio (2004), Panchapagesan and Werner (2004)].    Given that 
Canadian firms are different from other foreign firms, and that many Canadian firms continue 
trading in Canada after delisting,  it remains an empirical question as to what happens to 
Canadian firms when they delist in the United States, but continue trading in Canada. 
4.1. The impact of delisting on the returns of Canadian firms 
I use a standard event study methodology [Mackinlay (1997)] to examine the short-run stock 
price performance of Canadian firms that get delisted.  Abnormal returns are calculated using a 12 
2-factor market model, with the Canadian SP60 Index and the U.S. SP500 Index as the two 
market factors.  Specifically, coefficients are estimated for each security over the period from 
350 days prior to the delisting to 50 days prior to the delisting using the following regression: 
t i t SP SP i t SP SP i t i r r r , , 500 500 , , 60 60 , , e b b a + + + =  
Stocks with a price of less than $0.20 and stocks that traded on less than 50 days during this 300 
day estimation window are removed.  Stocks that have ceased trading in Canada prior to the U.S. 
delisting or within the ten days following the delisting are also excluded.  Therefore, our sample 
does not include those Canadian firms that went bankrupt or those that trade on the U.S. OTC 
Bulletin Board or Pink Sheets but not in Canada.  These screens reduce the sample to  52 
delistings. Then, Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) is calculated for each day in the window [-
20, 20] by averaging the market model abnormal returns across all of the delisting stocks and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) were calculated over this window [See Campbell, Lo, 
and Mackinlay (1997)].   As a robustness check, abnormal returns are also estimated using two 
other methods: (1) the market model using just the SP60 return; and (2) raw, unadjusted returns.  
The choice of methodology does not have an impact on the results, which is  probably because 
the variance of abnormal returns is not reduced much by using different models of abnormal 
returns [Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)]. 
Figure  4 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns starting 20 days prior to the 
announcement day and ending 20 days after the announcement day.  Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns are close to zero leading up to the delisting.  In the event window [-1, 1], there is a 
statistically significant negative CAR of  -10%.  Post-delisting,  there is a small, statistically 
insignificant rise in CARs.   
This -10% abnormal return is much larger than the abnormal US market return for all foreign 
involuntary delistings in Liu (2004), and is more similar to the abnormal returns experienced by 
U.S. firms [Sanger and Peterson (1990)].  Canadian firms are smaller than other foreign cross-
listed firms and may be more comparable in size to U.S. firms that get delisted.  Nonetheless, the 




4.2. The impact of delisting on the liquidity of Canadian firms 
 A loss in liquidity is often cited as one of the main reasons for the negative returns upon 
delisting.  Indeed, studies by Panchapagesan and Werner (2004)  and Macey, O’Hara and 
Pompilio (2004) show a sharp drop in liquidity after U.S. firms delist from major exchanges.  
However, it is possible that home market liquidity in Canadian firms could increase after the 
delisting if trading migrates back to the home exchange after delisting. 
Figure 5 shows the average dollar volume of trading in Canada during the time period around the 
delisting for the sample of stocks we describe above.  The average dollar volume appears to be 
higher prior to the delisting.  On the day of the delisting, there is also a spike up in dollar 
volume, possibly due to trading on the information contained in the announcement.  In the period 
from 50 days before the delisting to 10 days before the delisting, the average Canadian dollar 
volume is $653,000.  From 10 days after to 50 days after delisting, the dollar volume averages 
$155,000.  This decline in dollar volume is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Therefore, a 
U.S. delisting is associated with a large drop in home market liquidity. 
5.  Are Canadian more prone to be delisted than other foreign firms? 
Given that a delisting has several negative consequences for firms, it is important to determine 
what has caused so many Canadian firms to delist from U.S. exchanges.  Table 5 outlines the 
primary reason given for the involuntary delisting.  A large percentage of foreign and Canadian 
involuntary delistings are due to bankruptcy or firm size (insufficient capital equity, or assets).  
Only a few firms have been delisted to protect the interests of investors, and the Canadian firms 
delisted for this reason are small, mining companies.  Most importantly, about thirty percent of 
Canadian delistings on the Nasdaq are due to a failure to meet the minimum bid price criteria, 
whereas less than 10% of foreign firms delist from the Nasdaq because of a low share price.  
However, these results should be interpreted with caution since firms can be failing to meet more 
then one  criterion when they get delisted, and CRSP only records the primary reason f or 
delisting.    
I use duration analysis by means of a Cox (1972) proportional hazard model to examine the 
factors that  contribute to a foreign, U.S. cross-listed firm involuntarily delisting and to test 
whether more Canadian firms have been delisted after accounting for these factors. Similar 14 
methods have been used to model the initial cross-listing decision [e.g., Pagano, Roell, and 
Zechner (2002); Doidge et al. (2005)] and to model bankruptcy and bond defaults [ e.g., 
Shumway (2001); Chava and Jarrow (2004); McDonald and Van de Gucht (1999)]. The Cox 
proportional hazard model models the probability of delisting in year t, conditional on the firm 
still being cross-listed in the United States, using time-dependent covariates.
9  The hazard rate 
for firm i, h(t | xi ), is the instantaneous rate of involuntary delisting and is specified as follows: 
h(t | xi ) =  h0(t ) exp( xi ßx) 
In this equation,  xi represent the time-varying independent variables,  ßx is the vector of 
coefficients, and h0(t ) is the baseline hazard.  The model is semi-parametric, so that the only 
assumption about the baseline hazard is that it is identical for all firms.  All variables in the 
analysis are sampled at the end of each calendar year, and all explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year, so the sample runs from 1989 to 2006.  Once a firm stops being listed in the United 
States (either because it is  involuntarily delisted, voluntarily delisted, liquidates, or gets 
acquired), it is removed from the analysis.  A failure is defined as a firm getting involuntarily 
delisted. To test whether Canadian firms are more likely to get involuntarily delisted, I include a 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm is Canadian.   
5.1. Control Variables 
The following control variables are also included: 
1. Logarithm of total assets (book value in USD): The U.S. exchanges have specific criteria 
relating to firm size, number of shareholders, and number of market makers.  The logarithm of 
total assets is used as a proxy for these criteria, and should be negatively related to involuntary 
delistings.   
2.  The past year’s stock return:  The past year’s stock return is an indicator o f financial 
performance, and poorly performing firms are more likely to fall below the exchanges’ continued 
listing criteria.  I expect a negative sign on this variable, as firms that have lower returns in the 
previous year should be more likely to get delisted.   
                                                   
9 Shumway (2001) shows that a discrete duration model, similar to the one applied here, is identical to a multi-
period logit model under an adjusted standard error structure. 15 
3.   Post-2001 Dummy: As suggested by Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2004), Nasdaq and 
NYSE may have tightened their application of corporate governance listing standards following 
corporate governance scandals such as Worldcom and Enron.  Since the exchanges have 
discretion in how they apply their listing standards, they may have chosen to be stricter in 
applying these standards in the Post-2001 period.  In addition, firms may also be more likely to 
get delisted if they don’t meet Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.  Also around this time, foreign 
firms were required to file electronically with SEC’s EDGAR filing service and were required to 
file more documents with the SEC (translated into English).  While it is possible that more firms 
may have been delisted for failing to file the required financial documents, few firms were 
actually delisted for being “delinquent in filing”. 
4. Nasdaq Dummy: This dummy variable indicates whether a firm is listed on the Nasdaq stock 
exchange and is included because U.S. exchanges have different exchange listing criteria, and 
descriptive statistics show that at a top-level  Nasdaq  firms have a higher propensity to get 
delisted.  
5. Daily Standard Deviation: I use the standard deviation of the stock’s daily returns over the 
previous year as a control variable.  All else equal, a stock that is more volatile is more likely to 
fall below the $1 minimum price criteria and may also be more likely to meet other minimum 
listing criteria.  
6. Logarithm of Share Price: Sequin and Smoller (1997) show that share price is an important 
predictor of mortality for firms listed on the Nasdaq, as those firms that list on the Nasdaq as 
penny stocks (price less than $3) have a much higher mortality rate than those that are not penny 
stocks.  Therefore, the logarithm of share price is included in some models to control for the high 
mortality of low-priced firms. 
7. Industry Dummies:  Industry dummies are used because different industries  may have a 
different propensity to get delisted (see Figure 6). Mineral and Construction Industries have the 
highest proportion of involuntary delists, which partially explains why Canada and Australia 
contain more firms that have been involuntarily delisted since they have a higher proportion of 
firms from these industries.  These industries experience more delists since they are both cyclical 
and because several mining companies in  the sample have been delisted following alleged 
frauds.   16 
8. ADR Dummy: Firms listing using ADRs have more freedom to choose their U.S. trading 
price by setting the ratio of home market shares that each ADR represents, and they may perform 
a reverse stock split in the United States without performing a stock split at home by changing 
the ratio of home market shares that each ADR represents.  Also, stock splits generally require 
shareholder approval, whereas ratio changes do not so it may be less of a nuisance for an ADR to 
meet the minimum price criteria of the exchanges.  Therefore, I would expect ADR listings to be 
less likely to be involuntarily delisted. 
5.2. Cox Survival Analysis 
Table 6 displays the results of the Cox Hazard model.  Across all models, the Canada Dummy 
variable is positive and significant showing that, after controlling for  different  firm 
characteristics, Canadian firms are more likely to be delisted.  The only other variable in the first 
model is a Nasdaq dummy, whose coefficient is positive and statistically significant, so before 
controlling for any firm characteristics, Canadian firms and Nasdaq-listed firms are more likely 
to be involuntarily delisted.  Model ( 2)  includes several of the firm characteristic control 
variables including industry dummy variables, and shows that firms that have a higher volatility, 
lower returns, and firms with a lower stock price are more likely to be involuntarily delisted.  For 
the sake of brevity, coefficients on the industry dummy variables are not reported.  A Wald test 
rejects the hypothesis that the industry coefficient dummy coefficients are equal.  The Post-2001 
dummy variable is not statistically significant, indicating that Sarbanes-Oxley and changes to 
corporate governance standards have not substantially changed the likelihood that a foreign firm 
will get delisted.  The Nasdaq dummy variable is now only significant at the 10% level (and is 
insignificant in later models) due to the correlations between a Nasdaq listing and firm volatility 
as well as firm stock returns. 
Model (3) includes accounting variables measuring firm leverage and size, which reduces the 
number of involuntary delists included in the sample by almost one-third.  The magnitude and 
significance of the coefficients in Model (2) is robust to this reduced sample size.  The 
coefficient on the size variable is not statistically significant, given the correlation between stock 
price and firm size.  This confirms the results of Seguin and Smoller (1997), who find firm 
mortality is related to a firm’s price, and not to its market capitalization.  More levered firms are 
also more likely to delist.   17 
In Models (2) and (3)  the Canada dummy coefficient is still statistically significant, but  its 
magnitude is much smaller than in Model (1), which did not include any firm-level 
characteristics.  The characteristics  and performance  of Canadian firms seem to explain a 
portion, but not all, of the higher propensity of Canadian firms to get delisted.  However, the 
control variables may not completely capture all relevant firm characteristics, and the effect of 
any omitted variables may be to reduce the coefficient of the Canadian dummy if omitted 
variables measuring firm quality are negatively correlated with the Canada dummy.   
In Model (4), an ADR dummy is included since a large portion of non-Canadian foreign firms 
list using ADRs and these firms may have more freedom in choosing their initial U.S. listed price 
by choosing an appropriate ADR ratio.  Also, ADR firms may also change their ADR ratio (i.e., 
a reverse solo split), which does not require shareholder approval, to conform to the exchanges’ 
minimum price criteria.  The sign on this coefficient is positive and is not significant at the 10% 
level,  and the Canadian dummy variable retains its significance, which does not support the 
hypothesis that more Canadian firms are delisted because they do not list using ADRs.
10  
However, the sample of non-Canadian foreign firms that do not list in the U.S. using ADRs 
contains about 75 firms and is concentrated in countries like Israel and the Netherlands, so it is 
difficult to conclude definitively that it is the form of listing, and not some country-level effect, 
that is driving these results. 
Table  7,  Models (5) and (6) repeat the analysis by segmenting companies based on what 
exchange they are listed on.  Model (5) includes all AMEX and NYSE listed companies, while 
Model (6) examines only Nasdaq-listed c ompanies.  On the NYSE and AMEX, the Canada 
Dummy is statistically insignificant, while on the  Nasdaq, it is statistically significant.  
Therefore, these results seem to be driven by Canadian firms listing on the Nasdaq. 
Instead of defining a failure as an involuntary delist, Model (7) defines a failure as delisting for 
failing the exchanges’ minimum bid price requirement, while Model (8) examines the 
determinants of firms being involuntarily delisted for reasons other than the minimum bid price 
requirement.  In both models, Canadian firms are still more likely to delist after controlling for 
factors affecting whether a firm delists.  Leverage only affects delisting for non-price reasons, 
                                                   
10 Although not reported in this paper, ADR firms are more likely to perform reverse stock splits than other non-
ADR foreign firms.  This could be the case if it is easier for ADR firms to perform a reverse stock split, or if these 
firms need to perform more reverse splits to meet listing criteria in their home markets. 18 
probably because bankruptcy is one of the major reasons in this category for being delisted.  The 
ADR dummy is positive and statistically significant in Model (7), showing that ADR-listed firms 
are more likely to be delisted than other non-ADR foreign firms for failing to meet the minimum 
bid price requirements.  Again, although this is contrary to the hypothesis that these firms can 
use reverse solo splits to meet the minimum price requirements and avoid a delisting, it is based 
on a small comparison sample of non-Canadian, foreign firms that do not list in the United States 
using an ADR. 
5.3. Comparison to U.S. matched sample 
So far, Canadian firms have been compared to other foreign firms listed in the United States.  
However, the delisting experience with Canadian firms may be more similar to that of U.S. firms 
since the listing requirements and the characteristics of Canadian firms listing are more similar to 
those of U.S. firms.  Fama and French (2003) study the survival of U.S. firms listed on major 
U.S. exchanges in the 1980-1991 period, and find that 44% of new lists and 18% of seasoned 
firms are “delisted for cause” within the next ten years.   In this paper, almost 30% of Canadian 
firms have been involuntarily delisted over the sample period, but this proportion is not directly 
comparable to those of Fama and French (2003) because they include voluntary delistings in 
their definition of firms “delisted for cause”.  
To make a true comparison to U.S. firms, each Canadian firm is matched with a corresponding 
U.S. firm.  For each Canadian firm, I search for a U.S. firm that is listed on the same stock 
exchange and require that the U.S. firm lists on the exchange in the same year that the Canadian 
firm originaaly lists on the exchange.  This way, the firms are of comparable age (in terms of 
time listed in the United States), and this is important to control for because Fama and French 
(2003) find differences in survival rates based on listing year.  Essentially, this is comparing 
Canadian firms that cross-list in the United States to U.S. firms that went public (via an IPO) in 
the same year.  Next, the firm is matched by size by selecting the U.S. firm that is closest in 
market value to the Canadian firm and is in the same industry as the firm (based on 1 digit SIC 
codes).  If no match is found that meets these criteria and is within 30% of the Canadian market 
value, then I search for firms within 30% of market value in other industries.  If still no match is 
found, the Canadian firm is assumed not to have a match and is dropped from the sample.  This 19 
results in a sample of 384 matched pairs of Canadian and U.S. firms, of which 291 are in the 
same industry.
11 
Figure  7 provides a summary of the proportion of firms being delisted by exchange for the 
matched sample of firms.  Furthermore, the sample is broken down between those firms that are 
penny stocks (price < $3)  and those that are not.
12  Canadian and U.S.  firms that are not penny 
stocks have a similar propensity to delist.  Canadian penny stocks on all exchanges, however, 
seem to be delisted more when compared with U.S. penny stocks.  For firms in both countries, 
penny stocks and Nasdaq-listed firms have been delisted more.  In the United States on Nasdaq, 
6.6% of penny stock firms are involuntarily delisted on a yearly basis, compared with 8.1% of 
Canadian penny stock firms.  This is a considerable difference given that these firms are already 
matched on size, listing year and stock exchange. 
I examine characteristics of the Canadian and U.S. matched sample in Table 8.  The results for 
the sample of Canadian firms are similar to the earlier results for Canadian firms reported in 
Table 4, but are slightly different because of a smaller sample due to some firms dropping out in 
the matching process.  Focusing on the Nasdaq exchange (Panels C and D), the median Canadian 
firm size in both categories (delisting and not delisting) is larger than the median U.S. firm in the 
same categories.
13  Generally, those firms getting delisted from the Nasdaq have large negative 
stock returns of approximately 30% in both countries.  The U.S. sample of firms that do not 
delist, however, has a median stock return of about 4% whereas Canadian firms have a median 
stock return that is close to zero, so that Canadian firms may have underperformed after cross-
listing on the Nasdaq.  This corroborates the results of King and Segal (2006) and Mittoo (2003), 
who both find that Canadian firms cross-list following strong stock price performance and then 
underperform the market in the long-term (3 to 5 years) subsequent to the cross-listing.  Here, 
however, Canadian cross-listed firms are compared to U.S. IPO firms, who have also been 
shown to underperform the market post-IPO.  Perhaps managers may be better able to take 
                                                   
11 Matching could also be performed based on propensity score.  However, since the number of Canadian firms is so 
small, most propensity scores are lower than 2%.  Also, dimensionality is not a big concern given the limited 
number of variables used in the Cox Survival Analysis for Canadian and matched U.S. firms. 
12 This status is determined at the initial time of listing, or at the beginning of the sample period if the firm listed in 
the U.S. prior to the start of the period. 
13 Since I matched on firm size, the overall median firm size on Nasdaq is similar for Canada and United States, but 
since more Canadian firms delist from the Nasdaq this results in a higher median for both categories of firms.  That 
is, the not delisting category contains a smaller number of the largest Canadian firms, while the delisting category 
contains a smaller number of  the smallest U.S.  firms. 20 
advantage of opportunities to cross-list, rather than issue public equity for the first time, when 
the market is overvaluing their stock. 
In Table 9 , I perform the Cox survival analysis on this matched sample of firms.  Model  (1) 
includes just a Canada dummy variable and the Nasdaq dummy variable.  With just these two 
variables in the analysis, Canadian firms are not more likely to be delisted compared to U.S. 
firms.  In Models (2) and (3), the Canada dummy variable is still insignificant when controlling 
for additional variables such as the Percentage of Days Traded, Standard Deviation, Logarithm 
of Market Value, Logarithm of Stock Price and the Previous Stock Return.  I confirm the earlier 
results that show that more volatile firms and smaller firms, low-priced firms, and poor 
performing firms are more likely to get delisted.   
6.  Conclusion 
In sum, I find that more than one quarter of Canadian cross-listed firms have been involuntarily 
delisted from U.S. exchanges during the 1988 to 2006 period, with an even higher percentage of 
Canadian firms getting delisted from the Nasdaq stock exchange.  While many Canadian firms 
expect to benefit from increased visibility and liquidity following a U.S. cross-listing, those 
Canadian firms that eventually delist, who make up a large proportion of Canadian cross-listed 
firms, have had poor liquidity and only a small increase in analyst following after cross-listing.  
Moreover, a  delisting entails negative consequences for Canadian firms given the significant 
drop in their share price and home market liquidity following an involuntary delisting in the 
United States.   
After controlling for firm characteristics that have an impact on involuntary delistings, such as 
size, exchange listing, previous year’s return, volatility, and leverage, Canadian firms have a 
higher propensity to get delisted than other foreign cross-listed firms.  This suggests that 
differences in exchange continued listing rules and their application to Canadian and foreign 
firms which may have contributed to more Canadian firms being delisted.  As such, in a 
comparison to a U.S. matched sample, there  is no statistically significant difference in the 
likelihood of being delisted after accounting for firm characteristics.   These results suggest that 
Canadian firms may have been treated more similarly to U.S. firms under the U.S. exchanges’ 
rules and enforcement of their continued listing criteria. 21 
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Figure 1: Involuntary Delistings. This graph examines the yearly percentage of cross-listed firms 
involuntarily delisting by country and stock exchange.  For example, in each period (Pre-2001 and Post-2001), the 
numerator includes the number of firms that were involuntarily delisted during the period, and the denominator 
includes the number of firm-year observations during the period. ROW indicates firms listing in the United States 












 Figure 2: Involuntary Delistings by Size and Country. This graph examines the yearly percentage of 
cross-listed firms involuntarily delisting by size grouping and country.  ROW indicates firms listing in the United 









Figure 3: Number of Analysts. This graph shows the average analyst coverage from two years prior to 
listing to seven years after listing for Canadian firms cross-listing on a U.S. exchange between 1988 and 1999.  The 
average number of analysts following the firm is presented for only those firms where a match has been found in 
I/B/E/S, so results may be biased towards increased coverage if the firms without a match had no analyst coverage 
throughout the sample period.  Firms are grouped into categories based on their current status.  Other is mainly 
comprised of voluntary delistings. 
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Figure 4: Event Study of Involuntary Delisting Returns.  Abnormal returns are calculated 
using a 2-factor market model, with the Canadian SP60 Index and the U.S. SP500 Index as the two market 
factors.  Specifically, coefficients are estimated for each security over the period from 350 days prior to the 
delisting to 50 days prior to the delisting using the following regression: 
t i t SP SP i t SP SP i t i r r r , , 500 500 , , 60 60 , , e b b a + + + =  
Stocks with a price of less than $0.20 and stocks that traded on less than 50 days during this 300 day 
estimation window are removed.  Stocks that have ceased trading in Canada prior to the U.S. delisting or 
within the ten days following the delisting are also excluded.  Event Day 0 is the date of the delisting in the 





Figure 5: Liquidity around the delisting date.  This figure shows the average dollar trading 
volume for Canadian stocks that delisted in the U.S. and maintained their listing in Canada.  Stocks with a 
price of less than $0.20 and stocks that traded on less than 50 days during this 300 day estimation window 
are removed.  Stocks that have ceased trading in Canada prior to the U.S. delisting or within the ten days 
following the delisting are also excluded.  Event Day 0 is the date of the delisting in the United States. The 




Figure 6: Involuntary Delistings by Industry. This graph examines the yearly percentage of 
cross-listed firms involuntarily delisting.  For example, in each industry, the numerator includes the number 
of firms that were involuntarily delisted in that industry, and the denominator includes the number of firm-









Figure 7: Canadian vs. US matched Sample.  This graph examines the yearly percentage of 
cross-listed firms involuntarily for Canadian and matched U.S. firms.  The sample includes 386 matched 
pairs of firms.  In each subset, the numerator includes the number of firms that were involuntarily delisted 






Table 1: Numerical Continued Listing Criteria of U.S. Exchanges.  For each exchange, 
this table shows a high and a low required threshold for each of the numerical listing criteria. If a firm is 
below the high threshold for one criteria, it may be able to maintain its listing if it meets certain thresholds 
along some of the other criteria.  However, if the firm is below any of the low threshold criteria, it would be 
subject to suspension or delisting. This table is only meant as a top-level display of the exchanges 
continued listing criteria.  For full details on each exchange’s listing criteria, refer to the exchange listing 
manual. 
 
  NYSE  Nasdaq Capital 
Market 
AMEX 












Shareholder’s Equity  $75 
million 
  $2.5 
million 
  $6 million   






  $50 
million 
 





  $500,000 
(last year 
or in  2 of 
3 last 
years) 




Public Float (Shares)  600,000  600,000  500,000  500,000  1,100,000  200,000 
Market Value of 
Public Float 
    $1 million  $1 million  $15 
million 
$1 million 
Minimum Price  $1  $1  $1  $1     
Shareholders  1200  400  300  300  400  300 
Market makers      2  2     32 
Table 2: Involuntary Delistings by Year. 
 
Year  NYSE / AMEX    Nasdaq 
  # Delists  # Firms Listed    # Delists  # Firms Listed 
1988  0  83    0  124 
1989  0  97    0  138 
1990  1  110    7  147 
1991  0  124    6  145 
1992  1  139    9  162 
1993  1  167    1  175 
1994  2  213    9  198 
1995  7  232    3  216 
1996  0  275    6  253 
1997  3  324    8  272 
1998  5  347    9  279 
1999  5  360    14  291 
2000  7  390    8  320 
2001  3  409    12  309 
2002  6  415    20  281 
2003  5  420    3  240 
2004  6  432    1  218 
2005  1  428    6  204 
2006  1  405    2  170 
           
Total  54  5,370    124  4,142 
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Table 3: Delistings by Country.   
 
Country  NYSE/AMEX    Nasdaq    OVERALL 
  #  TOT  Prop.    #  TOT  Prop.    #  TOT  Prop. 
Argentina  0  11  0    0  4  0    0  15  0 
Australia  2  13  .15    6  21  .29    8  34  .24 
Austria  0  1  0    .  .  .    0  1  0 
Belgium  0  2  0    1  1  1    1  3  .33 
Brazil  0  11  0    .  .  .    0  11  0 
Canada  28  222  .13    88  205  .43    116  427  .27 
Chile  1  25  .04    .  .  .    1  25  .04 
China  0  13  0    .  .  .    0  13  0 
Colombia  0  1  0    .  .  .    0  1  0 
Denmark  1  3  .33    1  2  .5    2  5  .4 
Finland  0  4  0    0  3  0    0  7  0 
France  1  24  .042    1  13  .077    2  37  .054 
Germany  0  17  0    3  11  .27    3  28  .11 
Ghana  0  1  0    .  .  .    0  1  0 
Greece  0  4  0    0  2  0    0  6  0 
Hong Kong  0  6  0    0  3  0    0  9  0 
Hungary  0  1  0    .  .  .    0  1  0 
India  1  10  .1    0  1  0    1  11  .091 
Indonesia  0  2  0    .  .  .    0  2  0 
Israel  0  6  0    6  44  .14    6  50  .12 
Italy  0  11  0    0  1  0    0  12  0 
Japan  0  19  0    1  14  .071    1  33  .03 
Korea  0  8  0    0  2  0    0  10  0 
Luxembourg  0  3  0    0  6  0    0  9  0 
Mexico  7  31  .23    1  2  .5    8  33  .24 
Netherlands  2  22  .091    4  17  .24    6  39  .15 
New Zealand  1  5  .2    1  4  .25    2  9  .22 
Norway  0  8  0    0  2  0    0  10  0 
Papua New Guinea  .  .  .    0  1  0    0  1  0 
Peru  1  3  .33    .  .  .    1  3  .33 
Philippines  2  3  .67    .  .  .    2  3  .67 
Poland  .  .  .    1  1  1    1  1  1 
Portugal  0  3  0    .  .  .    0  3  0 
Russian Federation  0  4  0    .  .  .    0  4  0 
Singapore  .  .  .    0  4  0    0  4  0 
South Africa  0  6  0    3  14  .21    3  20  .15 
Spain  0  7  0    0  1  0    0  8  0 
Sweden  1  3  .33    1  14  .071    2  17  .12 
Switzerland  0  12  0    0  1  0    0  13  0 
Taiwan  0  5  0    0  1  0    0  6  0 
Turkey  0  1  0    .  .  .    0  1  0 
United Kingdom  5  73  .068    6  68  .088    11  141  .078 
Venezuela  1  3  .33    .  .  .    1  3  .33 
Total  54  607  .089    124  463  .27    178  1070  .17 
Total – ROW  26  385  .068    36  258  .14    62  643  .096 34 
 Table 4: Summary Statistics.   
 





s.d.  Stock 
Price 






Panel A: Canadian NYSE and AMEX – listed firms 
Not   Median  .087  1  .0232  13.4  .0745  1267  10  .172 
Delisted  N  1516  1516  1515  1516  1361  1368  1456  1368 
                   
Involuntary   Median  -.223  .996  .0446  3.7  -.055  83.4  3  .133 
Delists  N  147  147  147  147  133  135  114  135 
                   
Total   Median  .0755  1  .024  12.3  .0652  1060  10  .172 
  N  1663  1663  1662  1663  1494  1503  1570  1503 
Panel B: Foreign non-Canadian NYSE and AMEX – listed firms 
Not   Median  .0985  1  .0209  23.6  .127  7207  14  .167 
Delisted  N  3318  3318  3317  3318  2812  2884  3161  2876 
                   
Involuntary   Median  -.31  .992  .0407  6.42  -.008  718  4  .148 
Delists  N  162  162  162  162  130  135  146  135 
                   
Total   Median  .0878  1  .0213  22.7  .124  6386  14  .167 
  N  3480  3480  3479  3480  2942  3019  3307  3011 
Panel C: Canadian Nasdaq – listed firms 
Not   Median  -.011  .996  .0385  6.41  -.002  82.8  4  .0197 
Delisted  N  1076  1076  1076  1076  1001  1009  975  1008 
                   
Involuntary   Median  -.27  .893  .0539  2.13  -.181  23.3  1  .0637 
Delists  N  464  464  464  464  371  386  267  386 
                   
Total   Median  -.084  .984  .0421  4.98  -.043  59  3  .0276 
  N  1540  1540  1540  1540  1372  1395  1242  1394 
Panel D: Foreign non-Canadian Nasdaq  – listed firms 
Not   Median  .0216  .992  .0302  14.7  .0694  696  6  .091 
Delisted  N  2075  2075  2074  2075  1766  1816  1858  1809 
                   
Involuntary   Median  -.163  .948  .0434  6.36  -.053  127  1  .114 
Delists  N  220  220  220  220  161  171  153  170 
                   
Total   Median  .01  .988  .0313  14  .0641  577  5  .0929 
  N  2295  2295  2294  2295  1927  1987  2011  1979 35 
Table 5 :  Reasons for Involuntary Delistings.    This table reports the reasons given for 
involuntarily delisting, based on CRSP delisting codes. 
 
  NYSE / 
AMEX 
 
  Nasdaq    OVERALL 
  Canada  ROW    Canada  ROW    Canada  ROW 
Bankrupt  12  5    21  15    33  20 
Delinquent in Filing  .  .    7  1    7  1 
Financial Guidelines  13  10    2  1    15  11 
Insufficient Capital, Equity, or Assets  1  6    22  7    23  13 
Insufficient Market Makers  1  .    3  2    4  2 
Insufficient Shareholders  .  3    1  1    1  4 
Investor Protection  .  .    4  3    4  3 
Price  .  2    27  3    27  5 
Other  1  .    1  3    2  3 
Total  28  26    88  36    116  62 
             36 
 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Involuntary De-listings: Cox Survival Analysis. This table 
reports the results from a Cox Survival Analysis. The involuntary delisting dummy takes the value one in 
the year preceding an involuntary delisting in the US. Data are yearly and are taken on December 31
st of 
each year the company is cross-listed.  After cross-delisting, the company is excluded from the analysis. 
Post-2001 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all years since 2001.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Canada Dummy  1.092  0.514  0.634  1.037 
  (7.06)***  (2.99)***  (2.81)***  (2.63)*** 
Nasdaq Dummy  1.032  0.347  0.336  0.358 
  (6.14)***  (1.93)*  (1.44)  (1.62) 
Yearly Return (US)    -0.778  -0.669  -0.671 
    (7.73)***  (5.27)***  (5.32)*** 
Post  2001    -0.105  0.014   
    (0.55)  (0.06)   
Daily Standard Deviation    3.884  3.724  3.657 
    (2.86)***  (2.30)**  (2.30)** 
Ln(Stock Price)    -0.595  -0.636  -0.643 
    (8.44)***  (5.63)***  (7.00)*** 
Leverage Ratio      0.289  0.284 
      (2.49)**  (2.69)*** 
ADR Dummy        0.498 
        (1.16) 
Ln(Total Assets)      0.002   
      (0.03)   
Industry Dummies  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  9335  9331  7948  7948 
Firms  1070  1070  1017  1017 
Involuntary Delists  177  177  127  127 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table  7:  Determinants of Involuntary De-listings: Cox Survival Analysis for 
Subsets. This table reports the results from a Cox Survival Analysis. The involuntary delisting dummy 
takes the value one in the year preceding an involuntary delisting in the US. Data are yearly and are taken 
on December 31
st of each year the company is cross-listed.  After cross-delisting, the company is excluded 
from the analysis. Post-2001 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all years since 2001.  Model 
(5) examines only firms listed on the NYSE or AMEX, and Model (6) looks at  Nasdaq-listed firms.  
Instead of defining a failure as an involuntary delist, Model (7) defines a failure as delisting for failing the 
exchanges’ minimum bid price requirement, while Model (8) examines the determinants of firms being 
involuntarily delisted for reasons other than the minimum bid price requirement. 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  NYSE/AMEX  Nasdaq  Price  Other 
Reasons 
Canada Dummy  0.959  1.238  3.736  0.712 
  (0.83)  (2.64)***  (5.67)***  (1.75)* 
Yearly Return (US)  -0.586  -0.624  -0.752  -0.596 
  (2.02)**  (4.42)***  (3.38)***  (4.54)*** 
Daily Standard Deviation  9.417  3.877  -2.335  5.067 
  (1.58)  (2.33)**  (0.81)  (2.86)*** 
Ln(Stock Price)  -0.745  -0.599  -0.669  -0.620 
  (4.09)***  (5.05)***  (4.04)***  (5.87)*** 
Leverage Ratio  0.315  0.286  0.068  0.413 
  (2.09)**  (1.16)  (0.42)  (3.98)*** 
ADR Dummy  1.241  0.428  2.963  0.354 
  (0.97)  (0.84)  (4.01)***  (0.80) 
Nasdaq Dummy      2.439  0.046 
      (2.87)***  (0.19) 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  4533  3415  8000  7968 
Firms  590  481  1017  1017 
Involuntary Delists  39  88  24  103 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 38 
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Canadian and US matched sample. This table reports 
summary statistics for the sample of 386 matched Canadian and U.S. firms.  
 






Stock Price  s.d. 
Panel A: Canadian NYSE and AMEX – listed firms 
Not   Median  .0788  1  743  13.4  .0236 
Delisted  N  1287  1287  1287  1287  1286 
             
Involuntary   Median  -.247  1  62.5  3.53  .0465 
Delists  N  120  120  120  120  120 
             
Total  Median  .0665  1  638  12.1  .0243 
  N  1407  1407  1407  1407  1406 
Panel B: U.S. Matched NYSE and AMEX – listed firms 
Not   Median  .0897  1  515  17.8  .0256 
Delisted  N  1293  1293  1293  1293  1291 
             
Involuntary   Median  -.155  .996  87.3  7.87  .0415 
Delists  N  91  91  91  91  91 
             
Total  Median  .0852  1  431  16.5  .0264 
  N  1384  1384  1384  1384  1382 
Panel C: Canadian Nasdaq – listed firms 
Not   Median  -.0124  .996  129  6.5  .0386 
Delisted  N  1051  1051  1051  1051  1051 
             
Involuntary   Median  -.27  .901  31.8  2.26  .0539 
Delists  N  452  452  452  452  452 
             
Total  Median  -.087  .984  84.3  5  .042 
  N  1503  1503  1503  1503  1503 
Panel D: U.S. Matched Nasdaq – listed firms 
Not   Median  .037  1  106  9.56  .0409 
Delisted  N  1124  1124  1124  1124  1124 
             
Involuntary   Median  -.332  .992  27.8  2.73  .0572 
Delists  N  256  256  256  256  255 
             
Total  Median  -.0209  1  80  8  .0434 
  N  1380  1380  1380  1380  1379 39 
Table 9: Determinants of Involuntary De-listings: Cox Survival Analysis with U.S. 
matched sample. This table reports the results from a Cox Survival Analysis for the matched sample of 
384 Canadian and U.S. firms. The involuntary delisting dummy takes the value one in the year preceding 
an involuntary delisting in the US. Data are yearly and are taken on December 31
st of each year the 
company is cross-listed.  After cross-delisting, the company is excluded from the analysis. Post-2001 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all years since 2001.   
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Canada Dummy  0.213  0.276  0.185 
  (1.46)  (1.82)*  (1.17) 
Nasdaq Dummy  1.223  0.469  0.340 
  (6.56)***  (2.38)**  (1.77)* 
% of Days Traded    0.883  0.336 
    (2.04)**  (0.92) 
Daily Standard Deviation    8.033  3.060 
    (4.86)***  (2.10)** 
Ln(Market Value)    -0.479  -0.236 
    (8.18)***  (2.95)*** 
Yearly Return (US)      -0.807 
      (8.86)*** 
Post 2001      0.017 
      (0.09) 
Ln(Stock Price)      -0.365 
      (3.26)*** 
Industry Dummies  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  5924  5919  5919 
Firms  768  767  767 
Involuntary Delists  185  184  184 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 